Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment.
When software allows a user's input to contain code syntax, it might be possible for an attacker to craft the code in such a way that it will alter the intended control flow of the software. Such an alteration could lead to arbitrary code execution.
如何修复此漏洞
基于 10 条 Shoulder 检测规则的 Code Injection 预防策略。
Pass user input as template data, never use template.HTML with unsanitized input
package main import ( "html/template" "net/http" ) func handler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { userContent := r.FormValue("content") - // Vulnerable: user input cast to template.HTML bypasses escaping - unsafe := template.HTML("<div>" + userContent + "</div>") - tmpl, _ := template.New("page").Parse(`<html>{{.}}</html>`) - tmpl.Execute(w, unsafe) + // Safe: pass as template data, html/template auto-escapes + data := struct{ Content string }{Content: userContent} + tmpl, _ := template.New("page").Parse(`<html><div>{{.Content}}</div></html>`) + tmpl.Execute(w, data) }
Validate and sanitize LLM outputs before using in dangerous operations like exec or SQL
resp, _ := client.CreateChatCompletion(ctx, openai.ChatCompletionRequest{ Messages: []openai.ChatCompletionMessage{{Content: "Generate command for: " + task}}, }) cmd := resp.Choices[0].Message.Content - exec.Command("bash", "-c", cmd).Run() + + validCommands := map[string]bool{"ls": true, "pwd": true, "date": true} + if !validCommands[cmd] { + return fmt.Errorf("invalid command: %s", cmd) + } + exec.Command(cmd).Run()
Use predefined templates and pass user input as template data, never as template code
package main import ( "html/template" "net/http" ) - func handler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { - tmplStr := r.FormValue("template") - // Vulnerable: user input parsed as template code - tmpl, _ := template.New("page").Parse(tmplStr) - tmpl.Execute(w, nil) + // Safe: template is predefined, not from user input + var pageTmpl = template.Must(template.ParseFiles("templates/page.html")) + + func handler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + name := r.FormValue("name") + // Safe: user input passed as data, not template code + pageTmpl.Execute(w, map[string]string{ + "name": name, + }) }
Replace eval/Function constructor with safe alternatives like JSON.parse or predefined function maps
const express = require('express'); const app = express(); - app.post('/calculate', (req, res) => { - const expression = req.body.expression; - const result = eval(expression); - res.json({ result }); + const operations = { + add: (a, b) => a + b, + subtract: (a, b) => a - b, + multiply: (a, b) => a * b, + }; + + app.post('/calculate', (req, res) => { + const { op, a, b } = req.body; + const fn = operations[op]; + if (!fn) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid operation' }); + res.json({ result: fn(Number(a), Number(b)) }); });
Use static values for decorator parameters and avoid eval(), global modifications, or user input in decorators
- function DynamicRole(roleExpression: string) { - return function (target: any, key: string, desc: PropertyDescriptor) { - const original = desc.value; - desc.value = function (...args: any[]) { - if (eval(roleExpression)) { - return original.apply(this, args); - } - throw new Error('Unauthorized'); - }; - }; - } - - class AdminController { - @DynamicRole("user.role === 'admin'") + enum Role { Admin = 'admin', User = 'user' } + + function RequireRole(...roles: Role[]) { + return function (target: any, key: string, desc: PropertyDescriptor) { + const original = desc.value; + desc.value = function (...args: any[]) { + if (!roles.includes(this.currentUser?.role)) { + throw new Error('Unauthorized'); + } + return original.apply(this, args); + }; + }; + } + + class AdminController { + @RequireRole(Role.Admin) deleteUser() { /* ... */ } }
Use ast.literal_eval() for safe evaluation or avoid eval/exec entirely
- from flask import request - - @app.route('/calc') - def calculate(): - expression = request.args.get('expr') - result = eval(expression) + import ast + from flask import request, abort + + @app.route('/calc') + def calculate(): + expression = request.args.get('expr', '') + try: + result = ast.literal_eval(expression) + except (ValueError, SyntaxError): + abort(400, 'Invalid expression') return str(result)
Replace eval/exec with ast.literal_eval, JSON parsing, or subprocess with shell=False
- from flask import request - - @app.route('/calculate') - def calculate(): - expr = request.args.get('expr') - result = eval(expr) + import ast + from flask import request + + @app.route('/calculate') + def calculate(): + expr = request.args.get('expr') + result = ast.literal_eval(expr) return {'result': result}
Validate and sanitize LLM outputs with Pydantic before using in dangerous operations like eval, exec, or SQL
- response = openai.chat.completions.create( - model='gpt-4', - messages=[{'role': 'user', 'content': user_request}] - ) - generated_code = response.choices[0].message.content - result = eval(generated_code) + from pydantic import BaseModel, validator + import re + + class ValidatedOutput(BaseModel): + expression: str + + @validator('expression') + def validate_expression(cls, v): + if not re.fullmatch(r'[a-zA-Z0-9\s\+\-\*\/\(\)\.]+', v): + raise ValueError('Invalid expression format') + return v + + response = openai.chat.completions.create( + model='gpt-4', + messages=[{'role': 'user', 'content': user_request}] + ) + validated = ValidatedOutput(expression=response.choices[0].message.content) + result = process_validated_expression(validated.expression)
关键实践
- treated as untrusted input since: - Prompt injection attacks can manipulate AI responses - LLMs can hallucinate and produce unexpected outputs - Model behavior may change between versions Dangerous operations include: - Code execution (eval, Function, vm
- avoided or heavily restricted
- treated as untrusted input since: - Prompt injection attacks can manipulate AI responses - LLMs can hallucinate and produce unexpected outputs - Model behavior may change between versions Dangerous operations include: - Code execution (eval, exec, compile) - Command execution (os
查找代码中的漏洞
使用Shoulder扫描代码中的Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')模式。 10 规则.
# Scan with Shoulder CLI npx @shoulderdev/cli trust --cwe=94 # Or scan entire project npx @shoulderdev/cli trust .
检测规则 (10)
代码审查中需要关注的内容
这些模式表明潜在的Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')漏洞。在代码审查和安全审计中注意查找。
扫描你的代码库: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
Shoulder CLI 在整个代码库中找到易受攻击的模式。