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Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

🛡️ 4 rules detect this

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.

By providing URLs to unexpected hosts or ports, attackers can make it appear that the server is sending the request, possibly bypassing access controls such as firewalls.

Prevalence
Medium
3 languages covered
Impact
High
4 high-severity rules
Prevention
Documented
4 fix examples
2 Prevention
2 Prevention

How to fix this vulnerability

Prevention strategies for Server-Side Request Forgery based on 4 Shoulder detection rules.

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) HIGH

Parse URL and validate host against domain allowlist

+55 -11 go
  package main
  
  import (
      "io"
-     "net/http"
- )
- 
- func handler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-     targetURL := r.URL.Query().Get("url")
-     // Vulnerable: user-controlled URL
-     resp, err := http.Get(targetURL)
-     if err != nil {
-         http.Error(w, err.Error(), 500)
-         return
-     }
+     "net"
+     "net/http"
+     "net/url"
+ )
+ 
+ var allowedDomains = map[string]bool{
+     "api.example.com": true,
+     "cdn.example.com": true,
+ }
+ 
+ func isPrivateIP(ip net.IP) bool {
+     private := []string{
+         "10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16",
+         "169.254.0.0/16", "127.0.0.0/8",
+     }
+     for _, cidr := range private {
+         _, network, _ := net.ParseCIDR(cidr)
+         if network.Contains(ip) {
+             return true
+         }
+     }
+     return false
+ }
+ 
+ func handler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+     targetURL := r.URL.Query().Get("url")
+ 
+     parsed, err := url.Parse(targetURL)
+     if err != nil {
+         http.Error(w, "Invalid URL", 400)
+         return
+     }
+ 
+     // Validate scheme
+     if parsed.Scheme != "https" {
+         http.Error(w, "HTTPS required", 400)
+         return
+     }
+ 
+     // Validate domain
+     if !allowedDomains[parsed.Host] {
+         http.Error(w, "Domain not allowed", 403)
+         return
+     }
+ 
+     // Block private IPs (DNS rebinding protection)
+     ips, _ := net.LookupIP(parsed.Hostname())
+     for _, ip := range ips {
+         if isPrivateIP(ip) {
+             http.Error(w, "Private IP not allowed", 403)
+             return
+         }
+     }
+ 
+     resp, _ := http.Get(targetURL)
      defer resp.Body.Close()
      io.Copy(w, resp.Body)
  }
  
SSRF in Next.js Server Actions HIGH

Validate URLs against an allowlist of permitted domains before fetching

+8 -4 javascript
  'use server'
- 
- export async function fetchData(url: string) {
-   const response = await fetch(url);
-   return await response.json();
+ const ALLOWED_DOMAINS = ['api.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'];
+ 
+ export async function fetchData(url: string) {
+   const parsed = new URL(url);
+   if (!ALLOWED_DOMAINS.includes(parsed.hostname)) {
+     throw new Error('URL not allowed');
+   }
+   return await fetch(url).then(r => r.json());
  }
  
Server-Side Request Forgery via HTTP Requests HIGH

Validate URLs against domain allowlist before making requests

+25 -5 javascript
  const http = require('http');
- 
- function fetchUrl(url) {
-   // Vulnerable: no URL validation
-   return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
-     http.get(url, (res) => {
+ const https = require('https');
+ 
+ const ALLOWED_DOMAINS = ['api.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'];
+ 
+ function fetchUrl(url) {
+   const parsed = new URL(url);
+ 
+   // Validate protocol
+   if (!['http:', 'https:'].includes(parsed.protocol)) {
+     throw new Error('Invalid protocol');
+   }
+ 
+   // Validate against allowlist
+   if (!ALLOWED_DOMAINS.includes(parsed.hostname)) {
+     throw new Error('Domain not allowed');
+   }
+ 
+   // Block private/internal IPs
+   if (isPrivateIP(parsed.hostname)) {
+     throw new Error('Private IP not allowed');
+   }
+ 
+   const client = parsed.protocol === 'https:' ? https : http;
+   return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+     client.get(url, (res) => {
        let data = '';
        res.on('data', chunk => data += chunk);
        res.on('end', () => resolve(data));
      }).on('error', reject);
    });
  }
  
4 Warning Signs
4 Warning Signs

What to watch for in code reviews

These patterns indicate potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities. Look for these during code reviews and security audits.

🟠
user input flowing to HTTP client requests, enabling Server-Side Request Forgery attacks go-ssrf
🟠
Server Action '...' has SSRF vulnerability: user input controls HTTP request URL javascript-nextjs-server-action-ssrf
🟠
user-controlled input flowing into HTTP request URLs in Server Actions javascript-nextjs-server-action-ssrf
🟠
user input flowing into HTTP request functions without URL validation javascript-ssrf
🟠
user input controlling URLs in HTTP requests, allowing requests to arbitrary destinations including python-ssrf
🔍

Scan your codebase for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Shoulder CLI finds vulnerable patterns across your entire codebase.