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Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

🛡️ 4 Regeln erkennen dies

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.

By providing URLs to unexpected hosts or ports, attackers can make it appear that the server is sending the request, possibly bypassing access controls such as firewalls.

Verbreitung
Mittel
3 Sprachen abgedeckt
Auswirkung
Hoch
4 Regeln mit hohem Schweregrad
Prävention
Dokumentiert
4 Fix-Beispiele
2 Prävention
2 Prävention

So behebst du diese Schwachstelle

Präventionsstrategien für Server-Side Request Forgery basierend auf 4 Shoulder-Erkennungsregeln.

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) HIGH

Parse URL and validate host against domain allowlist

+55 -11 go
  package main
  
  import (
      "io"
-     "net/http"
- )
- 
- func handler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-     targetURL := r.URL.Query().Get("url")
-     // Vulnerable: user-controlled URL
-     resp, err := http.Get(targetURL)
-     if err != nil {
-         http.Error(w, err.Error(), 500)
-         return
-     }
+     "net"
+     "net/http"
+     "net/url"
+ )
+ 
+ var allowedDomains = map[string]bool{
+     "api.example.com": true,
+     "cdn.example.com": true,
+ }
+ 
+ func isPrivateIP(ip net.IP) bool {
+     private := []string{
+         "10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16",
+         "169.254.0.0/16", "127.0.0.0/8",
+     }
+     for _, cidr := range private {
+         _, network, _ := net.ParseCIDR(cidr)
+         if network.Contains(ip) {
+             return true
+         }
+     }
+     return false
+ }
+ 
+ func handler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+     targetURL := r.URL.Query().Get("url")
+ 
+     parsed, err := url.Parse(targetURL)
+     if err != nil {
+         http.Error(w, "Invalid URL", 400)
+         return
+     }
+ 
+     // Validate scheme
+     if parsed.Scheme != "https" {
+         http.Error(w, "HTTPS required", 400)
+         return
+     }
+ 
+     // Validate domain
+     if !allowedDomains[parsed.Host] {
+         http.Error(w, "Domain not allowed", 403)
+         return
+     }
+ 
+     // Block private IPs (DNS rebinding protection)
+     ips, _ := net.LookupIP(parsed.Hostname())
+     for _, ip := range ips {
+         if isPrivateIP(ip) {
+             http.Error(w, "Private IP not allowed", 403)
+             return
+         }
+     }
+ 
+     resp, _ := http.Get(targetURL)
      defer resp.Body.Close()
      io.Copy(w, resp.Body)
  }
  
SSRF in Next.js Server Actions HIGH

Validate URLs against an allowlist of permitted domains before fetching

+8 -4 javascript
  'use server'
- 
- export async function fetchData(url: string) {
-   const response = await fetch(url);
-   return await response.json();
+ const ALLOWED_DOMAINS = ['api.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'];
+ 
+ export async function fetchData(url: string) {
+   const parsed = new URL(url);
+   if (!ALLOWED_DOMAINS.includes(parsed.hostname)) {
+     throw new Error('URL not allowed');
+   }
+   return await fetch(url).then(r => r.json());
  }
  
Server-Side Request Forgery via HTTP Requests HIGH

Validate URLs against domain allowlist before making requests

+25 -5 javascript
  const http = require('http');
- 
- function fetchUrl(url) {
-   // Vulnerable: no URL validation
-   return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
-     http.get(url, (res) => {
+ const https = require('https');
+ 
+ const ALLOWED_DOMAINS = ['api.example.com', 'cdn.example.com'];
+ 
+ function fetchUrl(url) {
+   const parsed = new URL(url);
+ 
+   // Validate protocol
+   if (!['http:', 'https:'].includes(parsed.protocol)) {
+     throw new Error('Invalid protocol');
+   }
+ 
+   // Validate against allowlist
+   if (!ALLOWED_DOMAINS.includes(parsed.hostname)) {
+     throw new Error('Domain not allowed');
+   }
+ 
+   // Block private/internal IPs
+   if (isPrivateIP(parsed.hostname)) {
+     throw new Error('Private IP not allowed');
+   }
+ 
+   const client = parsed.protocol === 'https:' ? https : http;
+   return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+     client.get(url, (res) => {
        let data = '';
        res.on('data', chunk => data += chunk);
        res.on('end', () => resolve(data));
      }).on('error', reject);
    });
  }
  
4 Warnzeichen
4 Warnzeichen

Worauf bei Code-Reviews zu achten ist

Diese Muster weisen auf potenzielle Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)-Schwachstellen hin. Achten Sie bei Code-Reviews und Sicherheitsaudits darauf.

🟠
user input flowing to HTTP client requests, enabling Server-Side Request Forgery attacks go-ssrf
🟠
Server Action '...' has SSRF vulnerability: user input controls HTTP request URL javascript-nextjs-server-action-ssrf
🟠
user-controlled input flowing into HTTP request URLs in Server Actions javascript-nextjs-server-action-ssrf
🟠
user input flowing into HTTP request functions without URL validation javascript-ssrf
🟠
user input controlling URLs in HTTP requests, allowing requests to arbitrary destinations including python-ssrf
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